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Breaking Up is Hard to Do: 
Irrational Inconsistency in Commitment to an Industry Peer Network  
 
Abstract 
This paper strengthens the basis for a key claim made by contemporary economic 
sociology-- that the prevalence of strong ties among capitalists cannot be reduced to their 
rational considerations.  Support for this claim has been limited by reliance on an external 
standard of rationality, whereby irrationality in a capitalist’s commitment to a partner or 
network is based on an observer’s evaluation of an actor’s interests.  In this article, we 
address this limitation by developing an internal standard for assessing the rationality of 
an actor’s commitment, which is derived from Davidson’s (1980) definition of akrasia or 
“incontinence.”  In addition, we clarify the mechanisms that produce “akratic” 
commitment among capitalists: (a) short-term emotions that  overwhelm rational 
calculation; and (b) a sense of loyalty that leads one to incorporate others’ interests into 
one’s own.  Finally, we provide systematic evidence of akratic commitment and the 
proposed mechanisms from studies of an industry peer network in the remodeling 
construction industry.   
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Interviewer 1:  So when you decided to leave, how difficult a decision was that? 
Member (M):  It was very, very difficult. 
Spouse of M:  Very hard. 
IM:   We decided a year ago. We went to two meetings in the meantime. 
Spouse of M: We’d go and say … this is our last meeting, no matter what, our 
last meeting. Then as soon as we get there and we see everybody, 
well, maybe we should stay …. 
Interviewer 2:  Why maybe?  What were the maybes? 
M:   The history with the people. 
Spouse of M  Yeah, we really liked the people. We have strong relationships that 
seeing some of these people every six months was really, really 
nice. 
-- Interview with former members of Business Networks (an industry peer network in the 
remodeling construction industry), October 1999 
 
Introduction 
At the heart of contemporary organization theory and economic sociology lies the 
suggestion that the economy is shot through with linkages that are “stronger,” more 
“social,” or “embedded” than the arm’s-length transactions familiar from neoclassical 
depictions of the market.1  But what makes strong ties so widespread in the economy?  
The interpretation that underlies much of the growing attention by economists to such 
strong ties (e.g., Greif 1993; Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy 2002; Kranton and Minehart 
2001; Rauch 2001) is that their pervasiveness is due to their utility. According to this 
perspective, strong ties are instruments used by economic actors to achieve ends that 
cannot be achieved through more fleeting linkages.  Perhaps ironically, sociologists and 
organization theorists tend to agree that strong ties can be quite useful to economic actors 
(e.g., Baker 1990; Gulati and Garguilo 1999; Ingram and Roberts 2000; Uzzi 1996, 1997, 
1999) and have even ventured predictions for when strong ties should be observed based 
on their utility (e.g., Baker 1984; DiMaggio and Louch 1998; Kollock 1994).  In the same 
vein, we argued in earlier work (Zuckerman and Sgourev 2006) that economic actors join 
industry peer networks, which are small, exclusive groups of “parallel peers” (non-
competing firms in the same industry), due to the industry peer network’s distinctive 
processes for facilitating learning and enhancing their members’ motivation to achieve 
high performance.   
                                                 
1 In general, these terms refer to linkages that exceed a baseline of relational intensity and frequency 
corresponding to transient, arm’s length exchange (Granovetter 1985). 
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Yet this view of strong ties as instruments stands in apparent tension with a key 
reason that sociologists and organization theorists often give for their distinctiveness-- 
that commitment to them is not reducible to the rational calculation of self-interest (e.g., 
Granovetter 1985, 1995; Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr 1996; Uzzi 1997; Lincoln, 
Gerlach, and Ahmadjian 1996).  Uzzi (1997) provides perhaps the most compelling 
example of such irrationality (see also Lincoln et al. 1996; Sorenson and Waguespack 
2006).  He relates a case of a textile manufacturer who gave advance notice to his 
suppliers with whom he had an “embedded” tie that he was planning on moving 
production overseas.  Since those suppliers knew that they had no expectation of future 
business with the manufacturer, it would seem rational for them to cheat him.  The 
manufacturer’s willingness to risk such a response thus seems to violate his economic 
interests.  Moreover, since he was moving overseas and the relationship was ending, 
doing favors for his suppliers also seems inconsistent with his non-economic interests.  In 
short, the manufacturer’s actions seem to reflect an irrational level of commitment to his 
subcontractors.  And insofar as such cases are common, they imply that the prevalence of 
strong ties among capitalists cannot be fully ascribed to rational considerations.  Rather, a 
key reason such relationships are so widespread is that they tend to last beyond the point 
that they fulfill the actors’ interests. 
The notion that actors do not end strong ties as soon as they cease serving the 
parties’ interests seems compelling, as it reflects the general asymmetry between 
beginning a line of action (e.g., assuming a role) and ending it.  The literature on 
escalation of commitment has demonstrated (see e.g., Arkes and Blumer 1985; Brockner 
1992) that actors who initiate a line of action out of self-interest often continue that line 
beyond the point that it satisfies their initial calculation of self-interest.  A key reason for 
such escalation is that involvement in a line of action often induces actors to place “side 
bets” (Becker 1961; Schelling 1963) that (often unbeknownst to the actor) raise the costs 
of alternative lines of action.2  Such costs obviously cannot apply before the line of action 
has commenced, thus creating an asymmetry whereby the factors that reinforce 
commitment do not have counterparts for inducing initial commitment.  This asymmetry 
                                                 
2 For instance, someone who decides to attend graduate school in sociology but would like to retain the 
option of switching to economics if he doesn’t like sociology, may find that it is now harder for him to gain 
admission to economics programs. 
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is reflected in Simmel’s (1950: 380) concept of “faithfulness,” which he argued was 
characteristic of social relationships and defined as “a specific psychic state which 
insures the continuance of a relationship beyond the forces that first brought it about.”  
Accordingly, Uzzi’s case suggests that relationships that are founded on the basis of 
complementary economic interests ex ante are reinforced by a social orientation that 
shapes the relationship ex post. 
Yet, while compelling, a significant obstacle limits acceptance of the idea that 
strong ties among capitalists are common,  in part due to such actors’ predilection for 
irrational levels of mutual commitment.  In particular, past research in this area employs a 
standard for rationality that, while useful, has critical limitations.  Following Hollis 
(1987), it is useful to distinguish between external standards for rationality, which 
evaluate an actor’s actions according to some standard that is independent of the actor’s 
preferences; and internal standards, whereby the actor is judged irrational if she acts in a 
manner that is inconsistent with her preferences (cf., Weber’s distinction between 
substantive and practical rationality; Kalberg 1980; Levine 1981).  Past research on 
embedded relationships (as well as in the literature on the escalation of commitment) 
relies upon external standards of rationality-- in particular, the author’s interpretation of 
the actors’ economic interests.  By contrast, internal standards of rationality predominate 
in contemporary psychology and philosophy due to the recognition that “a person is 
entitled to a wide range of opinions, beliefs, and preferences (Shafir and LeBoeuf 2002: 
492).”  Reliance on an external standard raises vexing questions: Should we regard a 
capitalist as irrational if she acts against her economic interests but on behalf of her 
personal interests?  And what if the capitalist acts for the benefit of her industry rather 
than her firm, perhaps in the “naïve” belief that all others will do the same?   Clearly, we 
are on shaky ground if our standard for rationality requires that actors always agree with 
our construal of their “true” interests (cf., Warren 1990).  Accordingly, Uzzi (1997: 56) 
concedes that the actions of the manufacturer and suppliers in his case are “irrational only 
in the narrow, economic sense,” but that the actions are justifiable by the reasonable 
belief that altruistic actions further the collective interest, their own included”.   In sum, 
even systematic evidence of the behavior exhibited by Uzzi’s manufacturer (e.g., Lincoln 
et al. 1996; Sorenson and Waguespack 2006), provides only a limited warrant for 
  
4
concluding that relationships among capitalists are marked by irrational degrees of 
commitment.   
But suppose we found systematic evidence of slightly different behavior.  In 
particular, imagine that the manufacturer had reported that he would be better off not 
informing his embedded suppliers that he intended to move offshore, but subsequently 
(and despite no change in his preferences) he informed them anyway.  Such action would 
not only violate an external standard of rationality (if that standard is based on economic 
self-interest, but not if it incorporated others’ interests), but would also represent a clear 
violation of an internal standard of rationality, known as “weakness of the will,” 
“incontinence” or akrasia (see Aristotle 2000: Book VII; Mele 1987; Rorty 1985).  As 
Davidson (1980: 41) argues, such akratic behavior can be defended as rational only by 
rejecting the “principle of continence,” which holds that an actor should “perform the 
action judged best [by that actor] on the basis of all possible reasons.”  Below, we 
operationalize this principle as follows: If an actor weighs all available information at 
time t and concludes that action i is preferable to action j, the actor can rationally justify 
opting for j at some later time t+n only if: (a) his preferences changed between t and n, 
perhaps due to the arrival of new information during that interval; or (b) some external 
constraint operated during the interval, thus preventing him from choosing j. But if j is 
selected without either (a) or (b) occurring, then the actor was internally constrained in a 
manner that cannot be defended without rejecting the principle of continence.  It is hard 
to believe that the manufacturer, or many other people for that matter, would be willing 
to reject this principle and it is questionable whether such a rejection would even be 
meaningful (Davidson 1985). 
Of course, there is no evidence that Uzzi’s manufacturer defined his self-interest 
in this way.  But there is good reason to suppose that such internal constraints, which 
make “breaking up… hard to do (Sedaka and Greenfield 1962),” are quite common.  
Consider the remarks of the married couple and partners in a U.S. remodeling 
construction firm, an interview with whom is excerpted in the epigraph.  This couple had 
ended their membership in Business Networks, an industry peer network in the 
remodeling construction industry (see below; Zuckerman and Sgourev 2006), and they 
reported that a year elapsed between the time they decided that membership in Business 
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Networks was no longer benefiting their business and when they finally exited.  They 
explained that, when they tried to act on their decision to leave, they experienced great 
difficulty in severing their strong relationships.  They presumably took these strong 
relationships into account when they decided to leave, yet the relationships nonetheless 
constrained that decision.  That is, their actions suggest a degree of irrational degree of 
commitment according to an internal standard of rationality.    
This case is hardly dispositive.  To accept the idea that irrational  levels of 
commitment are partly responsible for the prevalence of strong relationships among 
capitalists, we require: (a) a clear internal standard for rationality against which such 
cases can be assessed; (b) a better understanding of the mechanisms responsible for 
irrationality; and (c) more systematic evidence that such irrational levels of commitment 
is common.  Accordingly, the remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  First, we 
develop our claim that irrational inconsistency or akrasia has distinctive advantages as an 
internal standard for assessing the rationality of actors’ commitments, by clarifying this 
standard of “arkratic commitment” and showing how it can be operationalized 
empirically.  Second, we argue that akratic commitment is a characteristic, though not 
universal, feature of social relationships; and that this is true even when the relationships 
are held by profit-seeking capitalists who initiated them for instrumental, self-interested 
purposes. We identify two mechanisms as responsible for akratic commitment, each of 
which can be discerned in the justifications given by the Business Networks members 
quoted in the epigraph and in the survey of former Business Networks members we 
discuss below: (a) short-term, positive emotions that may overwhelm rational calculation 
(“we really liked the people”); and (b) a sense of loyalty to others (“history with the 
people”) that may lead one to incorporate others’ interests into one’s own.  The next 
sections of the paper then present two studies of Business Networks.  The first exploits 
unique features of the Business Networks setting and study design to afford a systematic 
test of akratic commitment by Business Networks members.  The second sheds light on 
the relevance of the two posited mechanisms responsible for akratic commitment. The 
final section concludes. 
 
  
6
An Internal Standard for Judging the Rationality of Commitments 
To motivate and clarify our proposed internal standard for determining when a level of 
commitment may be considered irrational, consider two challenges to any claim that an 
actor has violated his preferences: (a) that the actor wanted to act in his self-interest but 
was prevented from doing so by factors out of her control; and (b) that the actor’s 
preferences changed (perhaps due to the arrival of new information) since the time they 
were stated and the action in question, thus resolving any inconsistency.  Research on 
residential mobility demonstrates the salience of each of these challenges.  According to 
Speare’s (1974) rational model, the resident’s overall level of satisfaction governs the 
decision whether to move residence, with such satisfaction a result of different 
components of the experience of residing in a particular home and neighborhood.  Speare 
reasons that these factors affect satisfaction, but that they cannot directly affect mobility 
since that would imply that something other than the actor’s satisfaction determined his 
action.  Accordingly, Landale and Guest’s (1985; cf., Bach and Smith 1977; Michelson 
1977) finding, that certain key “structural factors” (if the resident is a homeowner; if 
residence exceeds five years) depress mobility independent of satisfaction with home and 
neighborhood, seems to reflect an irrational degree of commitment due to “ongoing webs 
of social relationships (p.218).”  And yet, Landale and Guest concede that this conclusion 
is subject to the two challenges given above.  They admit that: (a) external constraints 
might have made mobility difficult (pp. 202, 218); and (b) residents’ preferences might 
have changed after being surveyed (perhaps because they confronted “practical 
problems” more seriously when confronted with “an actual move” [p.203]) such that their 
failure to move could be fully explained by an increase in their satisfaction with 
remaining in their residence (when compared to moving).   
The first of these challenges poses a significant but surmountable problem for 
empirical verification.  In particular, the researcher who wishes to interpret a pattern of 
action as reflecting irrational inconsistency must demonstrate, either through analysis or 
via study design, that the actors failed to follow through on their preferred course of 
action due to internal rather than external constraints.  By contrast, the second challenge 
seems more serious.  Insofar as an actor’s preferences can always change between the 
time they are measured and the moment of action, it is unclear how a claim of irrational 
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inconsistency could ever be verified.  Moreover, if actions can be interpreted as 
“revealing” preferences, then inconsistencies between preference and action seem 
logically impossible (see Sen [1977] 1979; 1993).  But what of our strong intuition that 
actions often contradict preferences?  We require a principle that captures this intuition 
and can be operationalized empirically. 
Davidson’s “principle of continence,” which represents the most influential 
contemporary statement in the philosophical literature on “weakness of the will” or 
akrasia, enjoins an actor to “perform the action judged best [by that actor] on the basis of 
all possible reasons Davidson (1980: 41),” is attractive in this regard.  This principle does 
not pertain to the failure of preferences at t to explain action over some interval t+n.  As 
discussed above, any such failure can always be explained away as due to (unobserved) 
change in preferences.  Rather, an actor violates the principle of continence because 
certain of his preferences at time t do in fact explain his action in interval t+n-- but the 
preferences at t that explain future action are in some sense the wrong preferences; or 
more precisely, they are weighed incorrectly.  To use a familiar example, one cannot 
accuse someone of irrational inconsistency if she decides to leave her intimate partner, 
but then regrets that decision at some later date.  It is not irrational to change one’s mind.  
But the failure to end the relationship is irrationally inconsistent--i.e., akratic-- if such 
failure can be predicted based on a different weighting of the very factors that the actor 
considered and evaluated at the time of the decision-- e.g., the fact that she will now be 
single suddenly looms larger than it did before.   
To operationalize Davidson’s principle of continence as an internal standard 
against which to assess the rationality of an actor’s commitments-- i.e., whether such 
commitments are akratic, we propose the principle of summary evaluation (PSE): 
An evaluation of an experience (e.g., living in a neighborhood, 
involvement in a relationship, participating in an IPN) should reflect all 
components of that experience known to, and evaluated by, the actor.  The 
decision to continue or repeat that experience should be based on that 
summary evaluation, but not on the component evaluations. 
As illustrated in figure 1, the PSE does not imply that the summary evaluation at time t is 
the only factor that should affect the exit decision.  Rather, there may be many factors or 
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components of an experience that are unknown to an actor at time t (perhaps because they 
have yet to occur), and other factors of which the actor may be aware, but which she has 
yet to evaluate.  Such factors should certainly (and rationally) affect the decision to repeat 
the experience once they become known and evaluated.  However, insofar as the actor 
knows and evaluates certain components of the experience at time t, the actor should 
rationally incorporate such components in her overall evaluation of the experience.  
Conversely, failure to incorporate such component evaluations into the summary 
evaluation at t means that the actor did not base her action on the best possible reasons.  
Put differently, while such component evaluations may have an indirect effect (mediated 
by the summary evaluation) on the decision to repeat the experience, a direct effect 
implies akratic commitment. 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Why is Breaking Up Hard To Do? 
Having clarified a useful standard for judging the rationality of commitments based on an 
internal standard of rationality, we must now clarify why actors, and economic actors in 
particular, might display such akratic commitment.  Breaking up is not always hard to do.  
But two mechanisms seem important in producing akratic commitment in many cases: (a) 
emotional attachment to the relationship; and (b) a sense of loyalty or duty to a friend.  
The first mechanism represents a classic form of akrasia (e.g., Mele 1987; O’Donoghue 
and Rabin 2005; Rorty 1985; Strotz 1955/6) in which the option chosen carries a short-
term pleasure that seduces the actor from following through on her plans.  An actor who 
has many strong ties (perhaps identified as “friendships”) among members of a group but 
determines that such ties are not helping him achieve his goals (both pecuniary and non-
pecuniary) must sacrifice the immediate satisfactions associated with such friendships for 
the longer-term benefits that he expects from alternative means of pursuing those goals.  
Rationally, it should be no sacrifice to give up short-term satisfactions for longer-term 
benefits.  But insofar as positive emotions spill over from successful economic exchanges 
(Lawler 2002), and insofar as “emotions are involuntary, internal responses that simply 
‘happen to people’ (Hochschild 1979; Lawler 2002: 349)” rather than being the product 
of deliberate, reasoned choices (see also Shafir and LeBoeuf 2002: 498-9), emotional 
attachments may override the decision to exit.  
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The second mechanism responsible for akratic commitment deserves particular 
attention because it paradoxically derives from rational action, albeit by an external 
standard.  To see how a sense of loyalty or duty can be the basis for akratic commitment, 
note first that a virtue of Davidson’s conception of akrasia (see Mele 1987 for a 
contrasting view) is that it recognizes that akratic actions can have morally neutral 
foundations.  Davidson (1980: 29) illustrates this point with a parable involving a person 
who has just crawled into bed after a tiring day, but who then realizes that he has 
neglected to brush his teeth.  The person considers all possible reasons for getting out of 
bed to brush his teeth and determines that these reasons (“…my teeth are strong, and my 
age decay is slow.  It won’t matter much if I don’t brush them [ibid.]”) favor remaining in 
bed.  And yet he gets up to brush his teeth because his “feeling that he ought to brush his 
teeth is too strong” for him to resist.  Such behavior is akratic because it is governed by a 
consideration that the actor regards as unpersuasive.  Yet this consideration is not a short-
term pleasure but an evaluation of the actor’s long-term interest. 
We can take this point a step further, by noting that people often act against their 
better judgment in order to fulfill a substantive ideal-- i.e., to satisfy an external standard 
of rationality.  Consider the familiar example of the assistant professor who “works too 
hard” at teaching at the expense of working on his research, thus damaging his chances at 
tenure.  Such cases are akratic when the young scholars have difficulty resisting the 
“temptation” to invest heavily in teaching even when they themselves believe they would 
be better off focusing on their research.  These scholars are sidetracked by a substantive 
ideal to which the university publicly subscribes even while it effectively penalizes those 
who try too hard to fulfill this ideal.  But since such substantive ideals compete with, and 
often trump, both self-interest and internal consistency in a culture’s values, actors often 
find that they can easily “rationalize” (i.e., justify to themselves as well as others) akratic 
actions in the name of such ideals.  “Would you rather I help students learn or that I 
focus on my career?” the professor might reasonably ask, and we would be hard-pressed 
to advocate for careerism.   
Similar tensions operate on social relationships as well, where the conflict is 
between a sense of loyalty or duty to the other and self-interest.  Consider our alternative 
version of the case of Uzzi’s manufacturer.  It would be akratic for the manufacturer to 
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inform his suppliers of his intensions to leave.  Yet such akrasia is easy to rationalize 
since it can be represented (to oneself as well as to interested audiences) as satisfying a 
more important value than either self-interest or internal consistency.  “Yes, you’re right 
that I would be better off not informing them,” the manufacturer might say, “but would 
you rather I betray my friend?”  And insofar as it is difficult to accuse an actor of 
irrationality when he thus satisfies a compelling external standard of rationality, akratic 
commitment thereby becomes more likely.    
In sum, two mechanisms seem important as drivers of akratic commitment to 
social relationships: (a) emotional attachments that hinder an actor’s ability to act in 
terms of (what she has determined as) her long-term self-interest; and (b) a belief (on the 
part of the actor and/or her audiences) that duty or loyalty to friends represents an ideal 
that may trump self-interest and internal consistency.  Of course, the mere positing of 
such mechanisms does not mean that they are salient, and we may be particularly 
skeptical that they are salient for such economic actors as IPN members who enter into 
their relationships for instrumental reasons.  Moreover, even if such mechanisms are 
salient, this does not necessarily mean that there is widespread violation of the PSE.   
Note in this regard that it is not even clear that the Business Networks members 
excerpted in the epigraph represent a case of akratic commitment.  In particular, it is 
possible that when deciding to exit Business Networks, they ignored their feelings of 
attachment and/or their sense of loyalty to fellow members.  In this sense, they may have 
been deceiving themselves, thereby underestimating the extent to which they were 
attached to their fellow Business Networks members.  But this does not mean that they 
violated the PSE.3  Accordingly, after describing the research setting of Business 
Networks (Business Networks), we now turn to two related studies: (a) an analysis of 
attrition from Business Networks, which uses unique data that afford a test for violation 
of the PSE; and (b) analysis of a survey of former Business Networks members that 
provides insight into the mechanisms involved in akratic commitment. 
                                                 
3 Whereas the inconsistency involved in akrasia pertains to an actor’s preferences, the inconsistency at the 
heart of self-deception involves an actor’s beliefs.  In Davidson’s terms (1985: 81-85), self-deception has 
two components: (a) “weakness of the warrant,” whereby an actor believes p to be true even if the weight 
of the evidence at her disposal (or even deductive logic; Pears 1985) points to not-p; and (b) “wishful 
thinking,” whereby the actor strongly desires to believe p.  Thus, self-deception is a case where wishful 
thinking is so strong that it induces weakness of the warrant.   
  
11
 
The Setting: Business Networks 
As discussed in greater detail by Zuckerman and Sgourev (2006), Business Networks is a 
private company based near Eugene, Oregon that organizes groups or “networks” of 
small, private residential construction firms that focus either on home remodeling or 
disaster restoration.  In the ten years we studied Business Networks (1998-2007), it had 
had between 160 and 200 members, grouped into networks of 6 to 14 members.  Each 
member consists of one or two (often married) owners; up to two additional employees 
typically attend Business Networks events.  As at all industry peer networks, each 
Business Networks network comprises firms are parallel peers in that they operate very 
similar business but compete in different (geographic) markets.  Zuckerman and Sgourev 
argue that industry peer networks appeal to members for two main reasons: (a) they 
provide unique opportunities to learn from peer firms; and (b) they have a distinctive 
capacity to motivate members to strive for higher performance.  The results in table 1 
(reproduced from table 1 of Zuckerman and Sgourev 2006: 1340-1), which gives answers 
to a 2002 survey question about the original reason for joining Business Networks, shows 
that Business Networks members cite both learning and motivation as critical to their 
participation in Business Networks.  With respect to learning, all respondents agreed 
(95% strongly so) that they had sought to “improve the performance of [their] company,” 
and virtually all (99%) agreed (87% strongly) that they had desired to “obtain new 
knowledge and skills.”  And with respect to motivation, virtually every member reports 
that enhancement of his or her “commitment to improve [their] company's performance” 
is an important consideration in their decision to continue being a Business Networks 
member and more than 90% ascribe importance to other members’ commitment to 
performance. 
 But just as is true for the many “embedded” relationships and groups described in 
much of the recent economic sociology literature (e.g., Granovetter 1985; Uzzi 1996, 
1997, 1999; Powell et al., 1996) industry peer networks are not simply arenas through 
which business information is discussed but quite intimate settings where members 
frequently engage one another on a personal as well as a business basis.  The fact that 
Business Networks members are small business owners, for whom the boundary between 
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business and non-business roles is especially porous, facilitates the formation of 
multiplex relations.  Many members cite a related reason that friendships form: the fact 
that they have relatively few alternative opportunities to meet others who engage roughly 
the same role-sets as they do-- i.e., with respect to employees, competitors, 
subcontractors, and family.  This “loneliness at the top” creates a basis for mutual 
identification conducive to forming strong bonds.  Moreover, Business Networks 
meetings are leavened with dinners and outings to local points of interest in a way that 
helps to deepen and broaden the members’ relations with one another.     
It seems evident that such deepening often occurs.  As one of the married co-
owners of the former Business Networks member excerpted in the epigraph remarked: 
“… there’s the whole group dynamic when we’re attending the meeting and the intensity 
of it and being together, you know, almost 24 hours a day for three days in a row, just 
promotes that sense of intimacy I guess that you can’t get anywhere else.”  And the other 
co-owner reported that they joined Business Networks on a “business basis,” it then 
“flipped to a personal basis.”  The pattern of “flipping” from business to personal seems 
quite common.  Thus, we see in table 1 that while Business Networks members tend to 
downplay the importance of friendship as the original consideration for joining (only 
20% agree that they joined “to make new friends”), it seems to be a more important 
consideration for their continued participation (82% [41%] report that it is [very] 
important that they “get an opportunity to interact with friends).”  In sum, while 
“friendship” is not necessarily a key dimension of attachment for all members of 
Business Networks, it seems to become important for many.  That is, members seem to 
escalate their commitment (Arkes and Blumer 1985; Brockner 1992) by making implicit 
side-bets in the form of friendships with fellow-members (Becker 1961; Schelling 1963).  
The questions before us are: (a) whether the commitments are strong enough to generate 
violations of the PSE; (b) whether such commitments can be accounted for in terms of 
the two mechanisms described above.  We now describe results from two studies that 
help address these questions in turn.    
 
Main Study: A Test of Akratic Commitment in Attrition from Business Networks, 
2003-2004 
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To recall, the assertion that an actor has acted akratically is typically subject to two 
challenges: (a) that the constraint was external rather than internal; and (b) that there was 
no internal inconsistency because the actor’s action is consistent with his new 
preferences.  Fortunately, the choice of Business Networks as a research site addresses 
the first challenge, and our study design addresses the second.  To see why Business 
Networks is a useful setting for studying akratic commitment, contrast the Business 
Networks member’s decision to leave with a resident’s decision to leave a home and 
neighborhood.  While residents typically must make significant expenditures to move, the 
Business Networks member incurs significant costs (financial as well as opportunity 
costs involved in attending and preparing for meetings; see Zuckerman and Sgourev 
2006: 1339) by remaining in Business Networks.  Of course, such costs can be seen as 
minor if the member industry peer network perceives membership to provide significant 
benefits.  But our focus in this paper is on cases in which the members doubt the value of 
membership.  Insofar as those doubts are strong, the fact that members have an economic 
incentive to leave Business Networks (due to the reduction in cost) means that the failure 
to act on those doubts reflect internal constraints rather than external constraints.   
 To address the second challenge, we focus not on whether respondents followed 
through on their decision to leave Business Networks but on whether they violated the 
PSE in allowing a component of their Business Networks experience (strong friendships) 
to lower their tendency to leave Business Networks, net of their summary evaluation of 
their Business Networks experience.  As discussed above and as illustrated in figure 1, 
such direct effects indicate an akratic failure to “perform the action judged best [by that 
actor] on the basis of all possible reasons Davidson (1980: 41).”  Data on when members 
joined and left Business Networks (as well as other variables relating to Business 
Networks membership and company financials) were obtained from Business Networks.  
We conduct an event-history analysis of the time to exit using two “clocks:” (a) 
Observation time begins on the day that the firm joined Business Networks (the earliest 
year of joining was 1986) and was thus first at risk of exit; and (b) analysis time begins 
either in July 2002, for those firms who had joined Business Networks by June 2002, or 
in July 2003, for those firms who joined by June 2003.  These dates were chosen because 
they represent the end of the periods during which Business Networks members could fill 
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out the web surveys we fielded between March and June of both 2002 and 2003 (full 
survey instrument available from authors upon request).  The dataset includes 218 firms 
and 357 firm-year spells.  Respondents to the 2002 survey who remained in Business 
Networks through June 2003 (and filled out the second survey) contribute two spells.4  If 
the firm remained in Business Networks through June 30th of the following year, the 
length of a spell was either the number of days from July 1 to June 30th of the following 
year; otherwise, the spell lasted until the firm announced its departure from Business 
Networks.  Since observation time begins upon entering Business Networks, the analysis 
is not left-censored.   
 The PSE mandates that insofar as Business Networks members’ attrition rates can 
be predicted from the member’s survey response, this should be true only for summary 
evaluations of the Business Networks experience, but not for components of the Business 
Networks experience that were evaluated on the same survey.  The main survey item that 
captures the respondent’s summary evaluation is the respondent’s level of agreement (on 
a 5-point Likert scale) with the following statement: “I am satisfied with my membership 
in Business Networks.”  The distribution of answers to this question is presented in table 
2, together with the percentage from each answer category who exited in the following 
year.  It seems clear that greater satisfaction is associated with lower attrition.  And 
results from the proportional-hazards Cox models presented in table 4 confirm this 
impression.5  As shown in model 1, an increase by one category of agreement that the 
respondent is satisfied with Business Networks membership reduces the baseline hazard 
of exit on a given day is reduced by an estimated 61% (or 1.00-0.39).6   
                                                 
4 Ten such firms failed to respond to the second survey.  They contribute only one spell and are considered 
to have remained in Business Networks in that spell.  More generally, response rates were quite high for 
each survey (148 of 167 or 88.6% of Business Networks members in 2002; and 167 of 190 or 87.9% in 
2003).     
5 In this and subsequent models, the coefficients are a product of a baseline failure rate and a positive 
function independent of time, which incorporates the effects of covariates. The model assumes no 
functional form for the baseline function. The assumption that the effects of the covariates are constant over 
time needs to be tested empirically and any non-proportional effects of covariates included in the model if 
they are significant.  The results of several tests suggested in the literature (see e.g., Yamaguchi 1991: 107) 
confirmed that the assumption of no interaction effects of covariates with time is not violated in this case. 
We adjusted the model to account for the clustering of errors within each network. Alternative model 
specifications (“stratified” and “shared-frailty” options in Stata) produced results that are substantially 
similar to the ones presented. 
6 The standard error reflected in the z-ratio reflects a 95% confidence interval that ranges from a hazard-
ratio of 25% (75% reduction in the baseline hazard) and 57% (43% reduction). 
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TABLES 2, 3, AND 4 ABOUT HERE 
 Yet while this summary evaluation predicts future attrition, results from model 6 
show that the friendship-based component evaluation predicts future attrition net of the 
effect of the summary evaluation, thus representing a violation of the PSE.   We derive 
this friendship component evaluation from one of three sociometric questions 
respondents were given on the survey.  Each respondent was given a roster with the 
names of the members of their Business Networks group and they were asked to note 
which members of their group, in the prior six months, had met one or more of the 
following three criteria:  (a) they were a source of “help or advice in solving a difficult 
business problem”; (b) they were someone the respondent “interacted informally such as 
one would with a friend”; and/or (c) the respondent “looked to them as sources of 
motivation or inspiration.”  We regard the number of fellow-members listed by each 
criterion as an evaluation of this component of the Business Networks experience.  In 
particular, insofar as a respondent nominates many fellow members as friends, this 
indicates that the respondent places a high value on the friendship component of the 
Business Networks experience.  Table 3 gives the distribution (for 2002) of the number 
of fellow-members (top-coded at ten) listed by each criterion.  We see that, consistent 
with their responses in table 1 and the fieldwork reported by Zuckerman and Sgourev 
(2006), Business Networks members place the highest value on the learning component 
(captured by the “help or advice” criterion) of their Business Networks experience.  And 
we see from figure 2 that a higher valuation of each of these components of the Business 
Networks experience is positively associated with the summary evaluation.  Note, 
however, that the association is lowest for friendship (r=.18; versus r=.26 for help/advice 
and r=.27 for motivation).7 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 Yet while the friendship component-evaluation has the weakest association with 
the summary evaluation, results from the event history analysis in table 4 show that it has 
the strongest association with future attrition.  We see from model 2 that the help/advice 
component evaluation is not significantly associated with exit.  And while model 4 
                                                 
7 An multivariate ordinal logit, which included all available survey and financial variables that were 
significantly associated with satisfaction, confirmed that the motivation and help/advice component 
evaluations were significantly associated with satisfaction, but friendship was not. 
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indicates that each additional motivation/inspiration nomination leads to an estimated 
decrease in the hazard of exit by just under 14%,8 the estimate is not reliably different 
from zero when friendship is included in model 5.  By contrast, the estimated decrease in 
the hazard with each nomination of a friend is 17%9 in model 3, and this estimate remains 
largely unchanged when the other component evaluations are included in model 5.  Note 
that we specify each of the component evaluations as splines (by including a dummy 
variable for whether they made no nominations) because, as indicated in table 3, the 
number of nominations is bimodally distributed.  In addition to this technical reason for 
using a spline specification, there is a substantive reason: the fact that a respondent lists 
no one may not reflect dissatisfaction but that the criterion is not salient.10  Accordingly, 
results from models 2-5 show that naming no one is associated with lower attrition from 
Business Networks in the subsequent year, an effect that is significant in the case of 
friendship.    
 Thus far, we have seen that the friendship component evaluation has the weakest 
association with the summary evaluation, but the strongest association with actual exit 
from Business Networks.  This pattern of results is consistent with akratic commitment 
because it suggests that actors’ commitment to Business Networks is driven by a high 
valuation of their Business Networks friendships, but they do not incorporate this 
component evaluation into their summary evaluation.  Accordingly in model 6, we find 
direct evidence that Business Networks members systematically violate the PSE.  In 
particular, we see that the friendship component evaluation has a direct effect on the 
hazard of exit from Business Networks independent of the summary evaluation.  Note 
that the estimates of the hazard rates in this model are virtually the same as those in 
models 1 and 3, when these variables are entered separately.  The estimated reduction in 
the hazard for each additional fellow member who is nominated as a friend (after the first 
nomination) is 15%11 versus 17% in model 3.  This indicates that the friendship-based 
component evaluation and the summary evaluation are largely orthogonal to one another, 
                                                 
8 The 95% confidence interval ranges from a 25% to a 3% reduction in the hazard. 
9 The 95% confidence interval ranges from a 24% to a 9% reduction in the hazard. 
10 As one respondent to the alumni survey said: “I don’t need anyone’s help to be social.”  Such a 
respondent would presumably list no friends.  But this would imply a rejection of friendship as a important 
component of the Business Networks experience rather than a low evaluation of this component. 
11 The 95% confidence interval ranges from a 23% to a 5% reduction in the hazard. 
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each operating in a distinctive way on Business Networks members’ (in)actions.  Even 
though rational consistency mandates that respondents’ valuation of their Business 
Networks friendships should rationally be incorporated in their summary evaluations, the 
results from model 6 indicate that respondents’ actions that they do not. 
 Additional Analyses and Robustness Checks. While we have shown systematic 
evidence for akratic commitment, it remains for us to substantiate the posited 
mechanisms responsible for such akrasia.  But before doing so, we report on five sets of 
supplementary analyses conducted to better understand the processes involved and to 
check the robustness of our test for violation of the PSE.   
 The key results from the first and second sets of supplemental analyses are 
presented in model 7.  First, we explored a wide range of financial and survey variables 
to see if they have significant effects on attrition.  Given space constraints and to 
conserve degrees of freedom in this small sample, we include in model 7 the only 
variable to have a significant effect on attrition: prior-year’s net profit (mean=0.59; 
SD=1.21).   That more profitable firms are more likely to leave Business Networks is 
consistent with the observation that more successful firms often begin to question the 
value of industry peer networks (see Zuckerman and Sgourev 2006: 1359).  Yet we see 
that the effect of the friendship component evaluation is robust to the inclusion of net 
profit, as well as the inclusion of a second variable that reflects the second set of 
supplemental analyses-- the respondent’s level of agreement with the statement that “I 
expect to leave Business Networks in the next 12 months” (see table 5 for the distribution 
of this variable and its raw association with attrition).  We include this variable,12 to gain 
a bit more insight into the akratic behavior that we have found.  In particular, while the 
behavior of Business Networks members reflects a significant degree of akratic 
inconsistency, it is possible that Business Networks anticipated that their level of 
satisfaction would be overridden by their sense of attachment to their friends, even 
against their better judgment.  If so, there should no longer be a direct effect of the 
(friendship-based) component evaluation when this variable is included in the analysis.  
And yet, while this variable has a large effect (the hazard of exit rises by 64% with each 
                                                 
12 Results were weaker when responses to “I expect to leave Business Networks in the next 3 years” was 
included instead. 
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increase of a level of agreement that one expects to leave in the next year), the friendship 
component evaluation continues to have a significant direct effect of virtually the same 
magnitude as before.  In philosophical terms, this suggests that Business Networks 
members’ akratic commitment is facilitated by self-deception.13   
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 The third set of supplementary analyses (not shown to save space, but available 
upon request) involved investigations of alternative specifications of the friendship 
component evaluation.  We found that: (a) that the results are not driven by variation in 
respondents’ general tendency to have many friends, as indicated by their response to the 
egocentric section of the survey;  (b) results tend to be slightly weaker, but substantially 
the same as those in table 4, when the proportion--rather than the absolute number--of 
fellow group members is used to indicate a higher component evaluation; and (c) that 
alternative specifications that take into account overlap among the three component 
evaluations do not change the results.  We interpret these results as indicating that: (a) the 
akratic commitment is driven by a sense of attachment to one’s Business Networks group 
rather than some more general attachment; (b) this sense of attachment should be 
assessed relative to a member’s personal baseline rather than a group standard; and (c) 
that this sense of attachment is effectively orthogonal to the dimensions of appeal that are 
more important in first attracting a member to Business Networks.  
 In the fourth set of supplementary analyses (not shown to save space, but 
available upon request), we considered alternative specifications of the summary 
evaluation.  One set of robustness checks involved using alternative specifications of the 
summary evaluation to see whether one could increase its predictive power and/or 
eliminate the direct effect of the friendship component evaluation.  In particular, and 
given the skewness in the distribution shown in table 2, we tried various combinations of 
dummy variables based on the response categories, but these alternative specifications 
did not change the results.  We also included three additional satisfaction questions that 
                                                 
13 One of the reviewers is of the opinion that our results do not support the claim that the BN members 
behaved akratically but rather that the summary evaluation “considers only non-friendship components.”  It 
is harder to sustain this objection in the face of the evidence that the friendship component evaluation has 
an effect net of the members’ forecast of their future attrition.  There seems no basis for expecting such 
forecast to leave out  friendship components.  In the current case, Business Networks members apparently 
wish to believe that they will not be akratically committed and that wish leads them to a higher estimate of 
their predilection for attrition than is implied by their own friendship component evaluation. 
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were in the same battery of questions as the general satisfaction question used in table 4:  
the respondent’s level of agreement that (a) the respondent’s firm’s “performance is 
benefiting from Business Networks membership;” (b) “From Business Networks, I am 
gaining friendship and social support”;  (c) “would endorse Business Networks to 
nonmembers;”   These variables were each considered as alternatives to the general 
satisfaction question and as elements in a factor score constructed from all four 
satisfaction variables.14  This analysis indicates that a single factor is responsible for most 
of the variation across these items and that the factor is aptly described as a measure of 
“membership satisfaction”. All four factor loadings exceed the 0.6 level usually taken as 
a cut-off point. However, when the factor score is introduced in the regression equation, 
its predictive power is weaker than that of the general satisfaction variable used in table 
4.  The effect of the general satisfaction variable was also greater than that of any of the 
alternatives, with only the first and third variables having significant effects on attrition.  
Overall, these results indicate that the general satisfaction variable is a good indicator of 
the respondent’s summary evaluation. 
 The insignificant effect on attrition of the “friendship and social support” variable 
gives a reason to be cautious in concluding that respondents’ friendships lead them to be 
akratically committed to Business Networks.  That is, it could be that this variable is a 
good indicator of the respondents’ friendship component evaluation and there is thus no 
evidence of akrasia.  We think such a conclusion is unwarranted for three reasons.  First, 
it does not explain why we see clear evidence of akrasia when the friendship nominations 
are used as the basis for the component evaluation.  And it is straightforward to see 
respondents who list more Business Networks members as friends as giving this 
component of their Business Networks experience a higher evaluation.  Second, a 
problem with the “friendship and social support” variable is that it comes after the 
general satisfaction and “economic performance” questions and are likely biased by 
them.  Two possible sources of bias are: (a) the component evaluation is more likely to be 
incorporated into a summary evaluation when the former comes after the latter; and (b) 
given the general tendency for Business Networks members to downplay friendship as a 
                                                 
14 We use exploratory factor analysis because: (a) we do not have strong theoretical priors regarding the 
factor structure of the data;  (b) our primary interest is in finding the combination that best operates as a 
baseline against which to gauge the effect of the friendship component evaluation on attrition. 
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reason for participating in Business Networks, some Business Networks members might 
downplay the importance of friendship and social support when it is framed against 
economic performance (the prior question) or if it is asked about in an explicit way (i.e., 
inferring it from the number of friends named).  Finally, rather than showing that there is 
no akratic commitment, the insignificant effect of the “friendship and social support” 
variable suggests that one of the two posited mechanisms for akratic commitment may be 
relatively unimportant.  In particular, this question (unfortunately) asks about friendship 
together with social support, which corresponds to the first of the two mechanisms 
(emotional attachment) rather than the second (loyalty).15  As discussed shortly, our 
second study further suggests that the key mechanism is a sense of loyalty to members’ 
friends.   
 The final supplementary analysis pertains to a potential complication in 
interpreting the results in table 4.  In particular, the action in question is one that does not 
have a temporally clear action implication: it is not clear when the dissatisfied person has 
stayed too long, especially since things can change post the time of the interview.  In fact, 
the PSE can be evaluated only in terms of variation-- i.e., the greater one’s summary 
evaluation, the more likely one is to leave later, and this association should account for 
any association between the component evaluation and future attrition.  That is, there is a 
sense in which it is difficult to ascertain when a particular person has violated the PSE, 
while it is possible to tell when the members of population generally tend to violate it.  
That being said, it would be awkward if it turned out that our results were being driven by 
the generally satisfied Business Networks members (who stayed in Business Networks 
even longer than they might otherwise).  Our supplementary analysis provides 
reassurance in this regard.  We examined the small subsample of 18 respondents who 
said they agreed that they expected to leave Business Networks within 12 months and 
found that the nine who did not leave nominated more friends (mean=4.66; SD=4.92) 
than the nine who followed through on their expectation of leaving (mean=4.00; 
                                                 
15 Both here and in the alumni survey to be discussed shortly, we measure the first mechanism with the 
term “social support” since fieldwork at Business Networks suggested that Business Networks members 
often express their attachment to Business Networks in these terms.  For instance, one member interviewed 
during the fieldwork credited his participation in Business Networks with saving both his business and his 
marriage summarized the benefit received from Business Networks by saying that “I crave and need the 
social support.” 
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SD=3.24).  This difference of 17% is substantively significant, though not statistically 
significant (t=0.34) due to the small size of this subsample. 
 
Supplementary Study: 2007 Business Networks Alumni Survey 
While the preceding analysis provides evidence for akratic commitment among Business 
Networks members, it provides relatively little insight into the mechanisms that might 
have produced such akratic commitment.  To gain a better understanding of such 
mechanisms, we invited all 82 Business Networks members who left Business Networks 
from July 2004 to July 2007 to fill out a survey regarding their decision to leave Business 
Networks.  To maximize response rate (no incentive for completing the survey was 
provided other than the promise of an article about Business Networks), the survey was 
very short, with questions that focused on: (a) the time it took them to leave Business 
Networks; (b) the reasons for their departure; (c) and their opinions about Business 
Networks and their experience with the process of exiting Business Networks.  A copy of 
the survey may be obtained from the authors upon request.  The survey was completed by 
27 former members.  After removing 4 Business Networks alumni whose email addresses 
we could not track down, this constitutes a response rate of 34.6%.  Given this small 
sample, results must be considered suggestive.   
 In interpreting results from the survey, it is useful to note two reasons not to 
expect respondents to report akratic commitment.  First, respondents should presumably 
display standard retrospective biases, which incline individuals to cast their past behavior 
in the best possible light.  Second, respondents who were embarrassed by irrational 
behavior could have opted not to fill out the survey.  And yet, respondents tended to 
describe the process of leaving Business Networks in quite akratic terms; and they 
seemed unapologetic about such akrasia because they tended to frame their difficulties in 
leaving Business Networks as driven by the second of the two mechanisms.  That is, 
loyalty to friends rationalizes the akratic commitment. 
 The survey results contain three sets of findings that pertain to the questions at 
hand.  First, each of the two posited mechanisms seems important, at least in the minds of 
survey respondents. Respondents expressed high level of agreement (64%, with 36% 
strongly agreeing only 21% disagreeing) with the statement that “Leaving Business 
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Networks was difficult for me.”  Those who did not disagree with this statement were 
then asked for their level of agreement with two statements designed to tap each of the 
two mechanisms.  Virtually all of the eligible respondents agreed both that “The social 
support I received from fellow Business Networks members made it difficult for me to 
leave.” (16 of 18 agreed, with two neutral and one missing response) and that and “The 
loyalty I felt toward fellow Business Networks members made it difficult for me to 
leave.” (18 of 19, with 1 neutral).  Note that while respondents to the alumni survey were 
also given the option of explaining in their own words why they found it difficult to leave 
Business Networks, very few did so.  This suggests that the items tapping “loyalty” and 
“social support” capture the main reasons respondents think it was hard for them to leave 
Business Networks.    
 The second key finding from the survey is that loyalty appears to be the more 
important mechanism.  Four sets of results support this conclusion.  First, while virtually 
all respondents who said they had difficulty leaving Business Networks thought that both 
mechanisms were important, they were significantly (Wilcoxon signed rank Z-score of 
2.060; two-tailed p=.039) more likely to express strong agreement that loyalty was 
important (11 of the 16 who agreed) than social support (6 of the 16).  Second, while 
those who cited loyalty were more likely to strongly agree (relative to lower levels of 
agreement) that they had difficulty leaving Business Networks (Z=3.38), there was no 
discernible difference (Z=0.67) with respect to social support.  And the third reason for 
ascribing greater importance to the loyalty mechanism pertains to an item that asked 
respondents whether they agreed that “My company stayed in Business Networks longer 
than it should have.”  Strikingly, 33% of respondents agreed with this direct concession 
of failure to act in their self-interest.  A perhaps more striking result is that respondents 
were less likely to agree that they had stayed too long if they reported more difficulty in 
leaving Business Networks and/or emphasized loyalty as the reason for such difficulty.  
While 50% of the 8 respondents who said they had no difficulty leaving Business 
Networks agreed that they had stayed too long; this was true of only 26% of the 19 who 
agreed that they had difficulty leaving, and only 18% of the 11 respondents who strongly 
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agreed that loyalty was an important factor.16  This pattern supports our interpretation that 
a sense of loyalty makes akratic commitment more likely because it rationalizes akrasia 
through appeal to a substantive ideal.  And given such rationalization, there is no reason 
for Business Networks members to regret the akrasia. 
 The final set of results from the alumni survey both reinforces the importance of 
the loyalty mechanism and speaks to the question of whether attrition from Business 
Networks truly involves violation of the PSE.  Respondents were asked to estimate two 
time-lags: (a) from “beginning to consider leaving Business Networks” and “deciding to 
leave”; and (b) between “deciding to leave” and “formally ending membership.”  
Respondents reported that the first time-lag took a considerable amount of time 
(mode=’More than 1 year’; mean and median= ‘6 to 12 months’).  The second time-lag 
speaks more directly to violations of the PSE.  Rationally, there should be no lag between 
the decision to repeat an experience (i.e., summary evaluation) and the execution of that 
experience.  And in fact, the modal response (25% of respondents) was a gap of less than 
one month.  But the mean and median response was a gap of “1 to 3 months” with more 
than a third saying that it took them more than 6 months (with 12% saying 1 year and 
12% more than 1 year) between the time that they decided to leave and when they 
actually left.  Finally, both sets of time-lags, and especially the second lag, were 
associated with the tendency to express stronger agreement with “loyalty” as opposed to 
“social support” as a reason for difficulty in leaving Business Networks.  In particular, 
whereas all eight of the respondents who expressed difficulty  leaving and took three or 
fewer months to execute their decision were equally likely to cite ‘loyalty’ as ‘support’, 
four of the eight who took more than 3 months cited loyalty over friendship, with the 
other four citing support and friendship in equal amounts. 
 
                                                 
16 It is difficult to say whether these results are statistically significant because it is not clear what the null 
hypothesis is.  Arguably, the null is that respondents who experienced the most difficulty leaving are the 
most likely to agree that they had stayed too long in Business Networks.  With such a null, the opposite 
association would likely be highly significant even in this small sample. 
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Discussion  
To recall, the main objective of our analysis is to put a key claim -- that the prevalence of 
strong ties among capitalists cannot be reduced to rational considerations-- on firmer 
theoretical and empirical footing.  Even when capitalists initiate such relationships for 
self-interested, economic reasons, their commitment often escalates due to the (often 
anticipation) addition of “social” elements that make it difficult to sever a relationship as 
soon as it is in their economic self-interest to do so.  Uzzi’s (1997) case of the 
manufacturer who gave his suppliers advanced warning of his plans to move offshore 
indicates irrational levels of commitment, as such behavior does not seem to satisfy either 
his pecuniary or his non-pecuniary interests. Yet while this case and supporting research 
(see especially Granovetter 1985, 1995; Lincoln et al. 1996; Powell et al. 1996; Uzzi 
1996, 1999) are compelling, the basis for seeing irrational levels of commitment as an 
important reason for the prevalence of social relationships among capitalists has been 
limited due to two factors (cf., Uzzi 1997: 56): (a) the lack of systematic, real-world 
evidence for such irrationality; and (b) the reliance on an external standard of rationality.  
We have endeavored to address these gaps in three ways: (i) by developing a clear, 
operationalizable internal standard for testing the rationality of actors’ commitments, 
which was based in Davidson’s (1985) definition of akrasia; (ii) by clarifying the 
mechanisms that make it likely that we will observe akratic commitment in social 
relationships; and (iii) by analyzing data on members of an industry peer network that 
provide a test for akratic commitment and shed light on the mechanisms involved. To put 
these contributions in context, we first note the limitations of our analysis and then situate 
our approach in the context of the literature on social relationships among capitalists. 
 Limitations. We note three limitations of our analysis.  First, we have seen that 
our key result-- i.e., that Business Networks members fail to incorporate the valuation of 
their friendships into their summary evaluation of Business Networks membership, 
thereby leading them to remain in remain in Business Networks longer than their 
summary evaluation would imply-- is sensitive to the measure used for the member’s 
valuation of his friendships.  In particular, akratic commitment is evident when the 
friendship component evaluation is measured as a function of the number of friends 
nominated prior to the summary evaluation, but not when an explicit evaluation is made 
  
25
subsequent to the summary evaluation and when the evaluation involves “social support.”  
Unfortunately, the data at our disposal do not allow us to determine which of these 
differences in the measures is most important for accounting for the difference in results. 
 Second, our analysis pertains only to Business Networks and then only to survey 
respondents.  Indeed, if nonrespondents in study 1 were more likely to leave Business 
Networks, it would seem likely that they were less akratic than were respondents.  This 
concern does not seem to have significant merit.  First, the response rate to the surveys 
used for study 1 was very high.  Second, since we have data on when both respondents 
and nonrespondents joined and exited, we can compare the attrition rates for the two 
groups.  This analysis shows that nonrespondents to the 2002 survey were indeed more 
likely than respondents to exit Business Networks in the following year (26.32% 
nonrespondents vs. 8.78% of respondents; t=2.34; p=.02).  Yet this difference was not 
significant for 2003 (17.39% vs. 13.17%; t=0.55; p=0.29); and the 2002 difference 
declined markedly when seven cases from a pre-test group were included (23.81% vs. 
10.3%; t=1.80; p=.07).  Finally, in additional proportional-hazards models (not shown), 
the effect on the hazard of exit made by whether a Business Networks member was a 
respondent or nonrespondent was marginally significant (p=.09).  In sum, while our 
estimate of akratic commitment at Business Networks likely may be biased slightly by 
our failure to get responses from all members, this bias does not seem substantial.  At the 
same time, results from study 2 must be tempered by the fact that we received a response 
rate of only 35%.  And while our analysis provides the first systematic evidence of 
akratic commitment among the hundreds of members of Business Networks, it is 
impossible to say whether similar analyses performed on other relationships or groups 
would produce similar results.  The generality of our results can be known only with the 
help of additional research. 
 Clarifying the Contribution.  In developing the idea that akratic commitment 
makes strong ties among capitalists more prevalent than they would otherwise be, we do 
not mean to imply that the use of external standards of rationality in past research on 
“embeddedness” are without value.  To the contrary.  It is reasonable regard the tendency 
for strong ties to lead capitalists act against their economic interests as more notable than 
the tendency for such attachments to lead capitalists to act against their own judgment 
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that the ties should be dropped.  Besides being the main way that capitalists are judged in 
our culture, a more general reason to favor an external standard of rationality such as the 
second one is that it addresses the key weakness of internal standards of rationality: their 
failure to deem irrational “utterly improvident action” such as suicide (Hollis 1987: 85).  
It is problematic to view someone as rational so long as she is rationally consistent if this 
means that it is rational for her to hurt herself or her interests, and especially if she later 
comes to recognize such interests as her own (accordingly, we deter others from 
committing suicide at least in part because we expect them to thank us later).  At the 
same time, we pointed out above why it is problematic to rely on external standards: who 
are we to say what are an actor’s “true interests”?  In particular, if Uzzi’s manufacturer 
acts on the basis of a broader interest than his narrow, economic self-interest, it seems 
awkward to call him irrational-- especially if this approach turns out well for him 
economically.   
 These examples illustrate that, in assessing the rationality of actors’ commitments 
and their actions more generally, it is fruitless to rely solely on either internal or external 
standards of rationality.  Each captures an important aspect of what it means for an actor 
to be rational, as reflected in Weber’s distinction between substantive and practical 
rationality (see Kalberg 1980; Levine 1981).17  Thus, while external standards of 
rationality should continue to command attention, there are important reasons to 
supplement such research with a focus on internal standards. 
 Accordingly, we conclude by noting a key lesson and key implication that derives 
from our focus in the present analysis on an internal standard of rationality.  First, we 
argue and provide supporting evidence that akratic commitment to a relationship is often 
justified (to oneself and others) as satisfying the substantive ideal of loyalty—i.e., an 
external standard of rationality.  Insofar as certain values are valued more highly than is 
internal consistency in following through on the course of action judged best, actors can 
rationalize inconsistency in terms of those, thus making akrasia more likely.  That is, the 
very existence of internal and external standards of rationality, coupled with the 
                                                 
17 Note that Simon (e.g., [1976] 1979) uses the term “substantive rationality” in a way that is at odds with 
standard usage in sociology, which derives from Weber’s notion of vertrationalitat.  In particular, Simon 
defines substantive rationality in terms of optimization of means to ends, and distinguishes it from 
“procedural rationality,” which involves reasonable processes for achieving such ends when optimization is 
impossible. 
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recognition that actors often face multiple, conflicting external standards of rationality 
makes irrationality by some standard more likely.  Thus one way of interpreting our main 
finding is that actors often must choose between two ways of rationalizing their behavior-
- via loyalty or economic self-interest-- and they often choose the former, even if it means 
being irrationally inconsistent as well. 
 This way of framing the matter leads us to our final lesson.  In particular, insofar 
as capitalists tend to determine their self-interest in terms of their economic interests, 
violation of the internal standard also implies violation of this key external standard for 
judging their behavior.  That is, while tests of irrationality based on internal consistency 
and economic self-interest sometimes lead to different results (e.g., suicide on the one 
hand; “false consciousness” among the working class [Warren 1990] on the other hand), 
they do not contradict each other in the present case.  Thus, in the alternative scenario 
involving Uzzi’s manufacturer, his behavior fails by both an external standard based on 
his economic self-interest (as in the actual scenario) and an internal standard (because, in 
the alternative secenario, he construed his interests in terms of his economic self-interest).  
Similarly, insofar as Business Networks members’ summary evaluation of Business 
Networks membership derives from their economic self-interest, their attrition patterns 
suggest both akratic commitment on their parts and a violation of their economic self-
interest.  In this sense, by focusing on an internal standard of rationality, we have arrived 
at results that bear importantly on whether capitalists violate their economic interests in 
remaining committed to their strong ties.  That is, our findings provide the first 
systematic evidence that the prevalence of social relationships is due to irrational levels 
of commitment, by either an internal or an external standard of rationality.   
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Table 1a.  
BN Members’ Rationale For Participating, 2002 Survey (N=148) 
 Proportion Answering 
.. Importance of the following… in your decision to 
join BN at the time that you originally joined.  
 
S.D.  Disag-
ree 
Neutral Agree S. A 
Desire to obtain new knowledge and skills      0.00 0.00 0.67 12.08 87.25 
Desire to make new friends             2.68 17.68 47.65 16.78 2.68 
Desire to improve organization in your professional life.      0.00 1.34 5.37 28.19 65.10 
Desire to get accountability before a group.    4.70 4.70 30.20 32.89 27.52 
Desire to improve the performance of your company. 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.37 94.63 
Desire to have clearer performance benchmarks.  0.00 2.01 8.05 32.89 57.05 
Endorsement by someone you trust.      3.33 5.41 25.00 42.57 23.65 
 
Table 1b. 
BN Members’ Rationale For Continuing Membership, 2002 Survey (N=148)  
 Proportion Answering 
..  in continuing to be a BN member, how important is 
it that...?  
 
Not 
at all 
Not 
very 
Some-
what 
Very 
Your company's performance improve?  0.68 2.72 27.89 68.71 
You get an opportunity to interact with friends?  1.36 17.01 40.82 40.82 
The costs of membership fees remain the same? 0.69 7.59 51.03 40.69 
Your commitment to improve your company's 
performance be enhanced? 
0.68 0.00 25.34 73.97 
You obtain new knowledge and skills?   0.00 0.00 12.93 87.07 
BN members to whom you feel close to might leave the 
network?  
0.68 29.45 46.58 23.29 
Other members be committed to improving their 
company's performance?  
0.68 1.36 31.97 65.99 
Membership gives you a greater sense of accountability? 2.72 4.76 41.50 51.02 
Table 2: Exit from BN By Summary Evaluation of Satisfaction with BN 
Agree that  
“I am Satisfied with my 
Membership in 
Business Networks”? 
N  
(2002 
Survey) 
Percent Who 
Had Exited 
By June 2003 
N  
(2003 
Survey) 
Percent Who 
Had Exited 
By June 2004 
Strongly Disagree 1 100.00% 0  
Disagree 2 50.00% 3 66.67% 
Neutral 27 22.22%  21 14.29% 
Agree 77 9.09%    89 15.73% 
Strongly Agree 41 0.00% 54 5.56% 
Overall 148 10.13%  167 13.17% 
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Table 3. 
Distribution of Nominations* of Fellow BN Group Members For Three Criteria for 
Relationship, 2002 Survey (N=148)  
Number of Nominations 
Made 
Percent Who Made the Given Number of 
Nominations According to Each Criterion: 
Help/Advice Friendship Motivation/Inspiration
0 8.78% 19.59% 25.68% 
1 7.43% 10.81% 18.24% 
2 12.16% 10.81% 9.46% 
3 13.51% 11.49% 5.41% 
4 10.14% 8.78% 14.86% 
5 5.41% 8.11% 6.76% 
6 11.49% 3.38% 7.43% 
7 12.84% 6.08% 3.38% 
8 4.73% 6.08% 3.38% 
9 3.31% 6.08% 4.05% 
10 or more 10.14% 8.78% 1.36% 
Mean Nominations 4.81 4.02† 2.93† 
Mean (excluding those 
who nominated none)‡ 5.27 (n=135) 5.01 (n=119) 3.94† (n=110) 
 
                                                 
* A “nomination” is a case where a survey respondent checked a name of a fellow member of their 
Business Network group on a roster, by one or more of the three criteria. 
† Different from mean help/advice nominations at p<.05 level, according to t-test. 
‡ Since the subsamples are slightly different, the t-test must be performed on a subsample that includes only 
those respondents who nominated more than one fellow-member on both of the criteria being tested.  For 
the first comparison, the subsample includes 114 respondents and the mean number nominated is 5.53 for 
help/advice and 5.11 for friendship.  For the second comparison, the subsample includes  105 members and 
the mean number nominated is 5.63 for friendship and 4.04 for motivation/inspiration. 
Table 4.  
Cox Proportional-Hazards Model of Exit from Business Networks, 2002-2004* 
 Model  
1 
Model 
2 
Model  
3 
Model 
4 
Model 
5 
Model  
6 
Model  
7 
Summary 
Evaluation 
       
5-Point Scale 
Agreement 
that Satisfied 
with BN   
 
 
0.390●●● 
(-4.83) 
     
 
0.399●●● 
(-4.48) 
 
 
0.583●● 
(-2.12) 
Component 
Evaluations 
       
Number of 
Nominations† 
       
Help/Advice   0.928 
(-1.31)
  0.991 
(-0.15) 
  
Friendship    0.831●●●
(-4.06) 
 0.852●●
(-2.44) 
0.858●●● 
(-2.88) 
0.851●●●
(-3.11) 
Motivation/ 
Inspiration  
   0.855●●
(-2.37) 
0.912 
(-1.17) 
  
Zero 
Nominations 
Dummy 
       
Help/Advice   0.556  
(-0.93)
  0.719 
(-0.51) 
  
Friendship    0.352●●●
(-3.27) 
 0.381●●
(-2.59) 
0.341●●● 
(-3.54) 
0.345●●●
(-4.09) 
Motivation/ 
Inspiration  
   0.603 
(-1.23) 
0.775 
(-0.53) 
  
5-Point Scale 
Agreement 
Expect to 
Exit BN in 12 
Mo. 
      1.642●● 
(2.21) 
 
Net Profit 
      0.083● 
(-1.66) 
Events 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 
Spells  315 315 315 315 315 315 315 
Wald χ2 23.32 2.02 24.33 5.95 51.88 50.07 97.65 
-2*Log 
Likelihood 
 
387.85 
 
405.84
 
398.65 
 
403.81 
 
397.45 
 
381.52 
 
372.51 
● p< .10 ●● p<.05  ●●● p< .01  
                                                 
* Coefficients are hazard ratios and the numbers in parentheses are z-ratios.  These z-ratios are based on 
robust standard errors, with clustering by BN group. 
† A “nomination” is a case where a survey respondent checked a name of a fellow member of their 
Business Network group on a roster, by one or more of the three criteria. 
Table 5: Exit from BN By Expectation to Leave BN 
Agree that  
“I Expect to Leave 
Business Networks in 
One Year”? 
N  
(2002 
Survey) 
Percent Who 
Had Exited 
By June 2003 
N  
(2003 
Survey) 
Percent Who 
Had Exited 
By June 2004 
Strongly Disagree 51 3.92% 57  8.77% 
Disagree 58 8.62% 65  6.15% 
Neutral 29 10.34% 37 24.32% 
Agree  9 55.56%  4 50.00% 
Strongly Agree  1 0.00%  4 50.00% 
Overall 148 10.13% 167 11.37% 
  
 
Components of 
experience known and 
evaluated at time t 
                 
Summary evaluation 
of experience 
at time t 
 
Act to 
repeat/end 
experience in 
t+n 
 
 
 Akratic Causation  
 
 Rational Causation  
Components of 
experience known 
and/or evaluated 
between t and t+n 
Figure 1:  
Irrational (Akratic) Overcommitment to an Experience Based on the Principle of Summary Evaluation 
  
